Priest and Klein's 1984 article, "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," famously hypothesized a "tendency toward 50 percent plaintiff victories" among litigated cases. Despite the article's enduring influence, its results have never been formally proved, and doubts remain about their meaning, validity, and generality. This article makes two main contributions. First, it distinguishes six distinct hypotheses plausibly attributable to Priest and Klein. Second, it mathematically proves or disproves the hypotheses under a formalized and generalized version of Priest and Klein's model. The Fifty-Percent Limit Hypothesis and three other hypotheses attributable to Priest and Klein (1984) are mathematically well-founded and true under the assumptions made by Priest and Klein. In fact, they are true under a wider array of assumptions. More specifically, the Trial Selection Hypothesis, Fifty-Percent Limit Hypothesis, Asymmetric Stakes Hypothesis, and Irrelevance of Dispute Distribution Hypothesis are true for any distribution of disputes that is bounded and both positive and continuous near the decision standard, even if the parties' prediction errors are not independent. The Fifty-Percent Bias Hypothesis is true when the parties are very accurate in estimating case outcomes, but only sometimes true when parties are less accurate. As shown in Klerman and Lee (2014) 
Introduction
Priest and Klein's 1984 article, "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," famously hypothesized that there will be a "tendency toward 50 percent plaintiff victories" among litigated cases (p.20) . Their article has been one of the most influential legal publications, and its influence is growing as empirical work on law has become more common. Compare Shapiro and Pearse (2012) to Shapiro (1996) . Even with the introduction of asymmetric information models of settlement, Priest and Klein's article continues to be cited by sophisticated empiricists and in respected peer-reviewed journals. See Hubbard (2013) ; Gelbach (2012) ; Atkinson (2009); Bernardo, Talley and Welch (2000) ; Waldfogel (1995) ; Siegelman and Donohue (1995) .
Despite the passage of more than thirty years since the publication of Priest and Klein's original article, their results have never been rigorously proved, and doubts remain about the assumptions needed to sustain their conclusions. Because Priest and Klein supported their argument only with simulations and an informal, graphical proof, the precise statement and scope of their claims have not been entirely clear. Waldfogel (1995) formalized Priest and Klein's model, following carefully their original set-up and notation, but without proving any results. Shavell (1996 p. 499, nn. 19-20) provided a sketch of a proof in a footnote. Part of the challenge is that the formalization involves a double integral over a region of integration that is only implicitly defined. (Waldfogel (1995) , p.237). Although Hylton and Lin (2012) also formalize and prove some of Priest and Klein's claims, they do so using a model substantially different from, and in many ways less general than, Priest and Klein's. 1 This paper provides the first set of rigorous proofs of various hypotheses that can be attributed to Priest and Klein, while remaining faithful to Priest and Klein's original set-up.
Nevertheless, before setting out the formal analysis, it is helpful to distinguish six hypotheses plausibly attributable to the Priest and Klein (1984) : THE TRIAL SELECTION HYPOTHESIS. " [D] isputes selected for litigation (as opposed to settlement) will constitute neither a random nor a representative sample of the set of all disputes" (p.4). This proposition is probably the most important contribution of their article.
THE FIFTY-PERCENT LIMIT HYPOTHESIS. " [A] s the parties' error diminishes" there will be a "convergence towards 50 percent plaintiff victories" (pp.18). This hypothesis is often called the Priest-Klein hypothesis.
THE ASYMMETRIC STAKES HYPOTHESIS. If the defendant would lose more from an adverse judgment than the plaintiff would gain, then the plaintiff will win less than fifty percent of the litigated cases. Conversely, if the plaintiff has more to gain, then the plaintiff will win more than fifty-percent (see pp. 24-26) . This hypothesis is most plausibly, like the Fifty-Percent Limit Hypothesis, a statement about the limit percentage of plaintiff victories as the parties become increasingly accurate in predicting trial outcomes.
THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE DISPUTE DISTRIBUTION HYPOTHESIS. The plaintiff trial win rate will be "unrelated … to the shape of the distribution of disputes" (pp. 19 and 22) .
Like the two previous hypothesis, this hypothesis is about the limit as the parties become increasingly accurate in predicting trial outcomes. This hypothesis is closely related to the Fifty-Percent Limit Hypothesis, but more fundamental. It is also more general, because it also applies when the stakes are unequal.
THE NO INFERENCES HYPOTHESIS. Because selection effects are so strong, no inferences can be made about the law or legal decisionmakers from the plaintiff trial win rate.
Rather, "the proportion of observed plaintiff victories will tend to remain constant over time regardless of changes in the underlying standards applied." (p. 31).
THE FIFTY-PERCENT BIAS HYPOTHESIS. Regardless of the legal standard, the plaintiff trial win rate will exhibit "a strong bias toward . . . fifty percent" as compared to the percentage of cases plaintiff would have won if all cases went to trial (pp. 5 and 23).
That is, the plaintiff trial win rate will be closer to fifty percent than the plaintiff win rate that would be observed if all cases went to trial. This paper explores the mathematical validity of each of these hypotheses, except the No Inferences Hypothesis. Klerman and Lee (2014) we remain faithful to their original set-up. In a separate paper, Lee & Klerman (2015) , we consider two extensions to the original model. First, we raise a novel critique of Priest and Klein's original model-that it is non-Bayesian -and show how the model can be modified to make the parties' behavior consistent with Bayes Rule. Most of the hypotheses set out above remain valid under this modified model. Second, Priest and Klein's model has been criticized for lacking an incentive-compatible mechanism. In Lee & Klerman (2015) , we address the possibility of ex post bargaining inefficiency by coupling Priest and Klein's model with an incentive-compatible mechanism-specifically the Chatterjee-Samuelson mechanism,. Under this model, we show that there will always be at least one symmetric equilibrium that will yield a fifty-percent plaintiff trial win rate, even when stakes are slightly asymmetric. Moreover, this and other results continue to hold even under the Bayesian modification.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explores a formalized version of Priest and Klein's model, and Sections 3 through 6 are devoted to analyzing the five different hypotheses. The Appendix contains technical proofs and additional results.
Formalization of Priest and Klein's Original Model
This section assumes familiarity with Priest and Klein (1984) and follows Waldfogel's (1995) formalization. Although there have been other attempts to formalize Priest and Klein's model (see Wittman (1985) and Hylton and Lin (2012) ), Waldfogel offers the formalization that is most faithful to the model in Priest and Klein's original article. See Hylton and Lin (2012) , n.5.
We begin by first presenting the formalization in the most general manner possible and then http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/141 introduce additional assumptions as needed for each hypothesis. We do not, however, introduce assumptions that conflict with the original model's set-up. In order to estimate the probability with which the plaintiff will prevail, both the plaintiff and the defendant need to take into account the fact that their estimates of case merit, ′ + and ′ + , are not wholly accurate. Therefore, they must estimate both the mean and standard deviation of their estimates of ′ . Priest and Klein (1984) assume that plaintiff estimates the mean of sampling distribution of ′ to be ′ + and the standard deviation to be . Waldfogel (1995) notes that under this set-up the plaintiff's subjective estimate of the probability it will prevail, = ( ′ ≥ * | ′ + ), will simply be = [ Priest and Klein are silent about how the parties bargain to arrive at a settlement.
Technically, the Landes-Posner-Gould condition is merely a sufficient condition for litigation, not a necessary one. Litigation might happen even if the condition is violated, because parties might not be able to agree on the settlement amount, even if there is a range of settlement amounts that would be in their perceived mutual interest. As modern mechanism design research has shown, bargaining is frequently inefficient. See Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) ; but see McAfee and Reny (1992) . Nevertheless, Priest and Klein (1984) and others using the divergent expectations model have assumed that the Landes-Posner-Gould condition is necessary as well as sufficient for litigation. We retain this assumption because this is consistent with Priest and
Klein's original model. In Lee and Klerman (2015) , we graft an incentive-compatible bargaining mechanism onto Priest and Klein's model and show that most of the results of the results remain valid for symmetric equilibria.
Priest and Klein allow for the possibility that parties may have asymmetric stakes and suggest there will be a deviation from fifty-percent in such cases. For example, the defendant 3 Priest and Klein and much of the later literature assume that "litigate" and "go to trial" are synonymous, because they assume that all cases either settle or go to trial. More recent work explores the fact that many cases are resolved by motions to dismiss or summary judgment. Gelbach (2012); Hubbard (2013) . Cases resolved by such motions are litigated, but did not go to trial. This article, however, retains the simplifying assumption that all litigated cases go to trial. The term "disputes" or "all disputes" means both cases that settle and cases that are litigated. may be more concerned about its reputation or an adverse precedent, so it may lose more from an adverse judgment than the plaintiff gains from prevailing. As Priest and Klein point out, asymmetric stakes can be formalized by assuming that the plaintiff would win if it prevailed and the defendant would lose J if the plaintiff won. If is greater than 1, then the plaintiff faces a greater stake in the litigation than the defendant, and vice versa. Taking into account the possibility of asymmetric stakes, the trial condition becomes − > ( − )/ .
Trial Selection Hypothesis and Irrelevance of the Dispute Distribution Hypothesis
Let , , ( ′ ; * ) denote the probability that a dispute ′ goes to trial when the decision standard is * and where the parties predict case merit with errors and that are distributed with mean zero and standard deviations and . We shall call this the "litigation probability function." When = = , we will simply denote this probability as , ( ′ ; * ).
, , ( ′ ; * ) can be written as the probability that
In other words, , , ( ′ ;
, , ( ′ ; * )
, where
, , ( ′ ; * ) can be expressed as a double integral over a region of integration that is implicitly defined by the inequality.
Figures 1a and 1b depict examples of litigation probability functions, , , ( ′ ; * ) for large and small for for cumulative normal distributions and = 1, = = , and * = 1.
As these figures show, when = 1 the probability of litigation is single-peaked and symmetric around * . Therefore, disputes close to * are the most likely to be litigated. In addition, as becomes smaller, the probability of litigation becomes highly concentrated near * . The plaintiff trial win rate, , , ( * ), is the area under the product graph with ′ > * divided by the area under the entire graph. Because the graphs become increasingly symmetric around * , it makes sense that this ratio converges to fifty percent as approaches zero.
Nevertheless, the fifty-percent result is not entirely obvious , because, as the graph becomes increasingly symmetric, both the area to the right of * and the entire area under the curve approach zero. In terms of the fraction in , , ( * ), the numerator and the denominator are both approaching zero, and the limit must be calculated. Furthermore, because both the numerator and the denominator include , , ( ′ ; * ), which is a double integral with the region of integration defined implicitly by an inequality, L'Hopital's rule cannot readily be used to simplify the fraction. For this reason, it is not clear that the limit will be exactly fifty-percent (assuming, of course, = 1). Hence, an analysis of the behavior at the limit is warranted.
Note that , , ( * ), as written, depends on many parameters, including the shape of the distribution of disputes, ( ′ ). In the limit as and approach zero, however, the plaintiff trial win rate will not vary with the distribution of disputes. The following Proposition provides the specific functional form for the limit of the plaintiff trial win rate and establishes the 3. For > 1 + − , the limit value will always be 1 regardless of ( ′ ).
4. For = 1 + − , then regardless of ( ′ ), the limit value will be Before we go on, we make a few observations. First, although , , ( * ) is welldefined for all positive values, it is undefined at = 0. 5 This is because when = 0, each party knows whether it will win or lose with 100-percent certainty and no disputes will go to trial.
Proposition 1 is therefore a statement about the limit value of a function at a point at which it is not continuous (since undefined). Second, for − < < 1 + − , the limit value of the plaintiff trial win rate does not depend on the shape of the distribution of disputes, ( ′ ), but only on the shape of the litigation probability function, ,1, ( ; 0), which in turn depends only on the shape of 1, ( , ) and the region of integration (affected by ). Third, when > 1 + − , the limit value of plaintiff trial win rate will also not depend on the distribution of disputes because it will be 1 regardless of , , and ( ′ ). The intuition for this last point is as follows.
When > 1 + − and thus the plaintiff has a significantly greater stake than the defendant, there is a threshold case estimate for the plaintiff, 0 > * , above which the defendant will be unable to make an attractive settlement offer even for disputes the defendant is sure the plaintiff will win. Thus, as goes to zero, all disputes that are intrinsically stronger cases for plaintiffs than ′ = 0 will litigate, but no cases below the threshold value will get litigated. Therefore, in the limit, plaintiffs will win all litigated cases, and the limit value of the plaintiff trial win rate is 1. When = 1 + − , the plaintiff trial win rate becomes more complex, and we can only prove the irrelevance of the dispute distribution with additional assumptions. Nevertheless, this complexity is of little real-world significance, because it is relevant only when is precisely 1 + − , and there is no reason to think that , a parameter that can take any value between zero and infinity, takes on the precise value of 1 + − with any empirically significant frequency.
The formal proof is included in the Appendix. We include only a portion of the proof here. Since = / = for a fixed > 0, as approaches zero, necessarily approaches Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the region of integration when = 1. Figure 3a shows the region of integration for = 1. The most important thing is that the region of integration, ( , ), is always bounded by a horizontal asymptote above and by a vertical asymptote on the left. In other words, the region of integration can be contained by a translated fourth quadrant.
As discussed in greater detail in Section 3.3 and Lemma A1 and as illustrated in Figures 5a and   5b , the region of integration will, in fact, have that property whenever − < < 1 + − . In contrast, as illustrated in Figure 3b and proved in Lemma A1, for > 1 + − , ( , ) will not be bounded by any horizontal asymptote, but will be characterized by two vertical asymptotes. To show this upper-bound function is Lesbesgue-integrable-in other words, that the integral of the constructed function is indeed finite-we make use of the bivariate version of Chebyshev's Inequality. Here is the intuition. Note from Figure 3a that ,1, ( ; 0) is calculated as follows: for each point ( , / ), along the line = / , the integral of 1, ( , ) is centered at ( , / ) and is integrated over ( , ). Since ( ′ ) is bounded above, we need only show that ,1, ( ; 0) is dominated by a Lebesgue-integrable function. But notice that after some threshold point 0 in either direction, ( , ) will always be properly contained in the set that is the complement of a square box centered at ( , / ), whose length increases as increases.
Therefore, ,1, ( ; 0), eventually, will always be strictly smaller than the integral of 1, ( , ) centered at ( , / ) but integrated over the complement of the square box with an increasing length. Because Chebyshev's Inequality gives us an inverse quadratic relation between the distance from the mean and the integration of any probability distribution away from the mean by that distance, the integral of 1, ( , ) centered at ( , / ) over the complement of the square box must eventually decrease at least as fast as the speed of −2 , which must converge to a finite value. Hence, a Lebesgue-integrable dominating function is constructed, and we can take the limits under the integral.
In contrast, when > 1 + − , it is easy to see that ( , ) is characterized as a region to the right of a graph that is characterized by two vertical asymptotes (shown in Figure 3b ). In this case, ( , ) will properly contain a region defined by ≥ 0 for some 0 > 0. To get the limit, we employ Chebyshev's Inequality to the complement of ( , ) for the numerator. We can show that the numerator and the denominator must diverge to infinity for positive at the same pace, and thus the limit will equal 1.
Proposition 1 is stated in a highly general terms. For most of the rest of the paper, we will assume that the parties' errors have a common standard deviation (that is, = and therefore = 1) . Thus we will drop the subscript , which measures the extent to which plaintiff or defendant formed more accurate estimates of the true case value. Priest and Klein did not consider the possibility that the parties differ in their ability to estimate case quality.
Nevertheless, by varying the value of , we can explore the effect of asymmetric information.
See Lee & Klerman (2015) .
Fifty-Percent Limit Hypothesis
The fact that we are able to derive the functional form of the limit value is useful, because it means that, for ∈ ( − , 1 + − ), the limit value will equal fifty percent only when
is equal to fifty percent, and not otherwise. Therefore, the limit value of the plaintiff trial win rate will be determined entirely by the shape of ,1 ( ; 0). For example, if ,1 ( ; 0) is symmetric around zero, the limit value will equal exactly fifty percent; and if ,1 ( ; 0) is not symmetric around zero, the limit value will not equal exactly fifty percent except by coincidence. It turns out that when the stakes are equal ( = 1), parties are equally well informed ( = 1), and , ( , ) is symmetric in , in , and with respect to and (that is, , ( , ) = , ( , )), then 1,1 ( ; 0) will in fact be symmetric around zero (see Appendix). Thus, we have the following proposition. 
Asymmetric Stakes Hypothesis
In this section, we discuss disputes with asymmetric stakes, ≠ 1. The defendant might have more at stake, < 1, in cases involving product liability, where an adverse judgment would damage the defendant's reputation or could be used against it in other cases. Conversely, but less commonly, the plaintiff would have more at stake, > 1, in cases alleging patent infringement, where a judgment invalidating the patent would bar suits against other alleged infringers. In these cases, the litigation probability function will not be symmetric and will not center around * . Instead, if the plaintiff has less at stake than the defendant, the litigation probability will peak before * ; and if the plaintiff has more at stake than the defendant, the litigation probability function will peak after * . Figures 4a and 4b depict litigation probability functions for = 0.5 and = 1.5. Figure 4a . , , ( ′ ; 1) for = 0.5. Figure 4b . , , ( ′ ; 1) for = 1.5.
In addition, if ≠ 1, the region of integration, ( , ), will not be symmetric with respect to the line = − , and thus the limit value will not equal to fifty percent. In fact, we show in the Appendix that when − < < 1 the region of integration will be biased towards the thirdquadrant. As shown in Figure 5a , when − < < 1, the top boundary of ( , ), when reflected across the line = − is bounded left by the left boundary of ( , ). The reflection of the top boundary is represented by the dotted line. This shows that ( , ) is composed of a subregion that is symmetric around = − and a separate subregion that lies entirely below = − (the side more favorable toward the plaintiff). Conversely, when 1 < < 1 + − , the region of integration will be biased towards the first-quadrant. As shown in Figure 5b , this time the left boundary of ( , ), when reflected across the line = − is bounded above by the top boundary of ( , ), indicating more litigated cases for the defendant. These graphs suggest the following proposition, which is proved in the Appendix. Figure 6 illustrates a Mathematica simulation for the win-rate for using normal distributions. 6 Interestingly, the result is not strictly monotonic for 1 < < 1 + − . Instead, there is a slight dip in the beginning.
6 Waldfogel (1995) does not assume − varies in relations to . See Waldfogel (1995) , p.236. The simulation likewise maintains this assumption. The result of Proposition 3, however, holds more generally and is independent of this assumption. 
Fifty-Percent Bias Hypothesis
Thus far we have limited our analysis to hypotheses relating to the limit as parties become increasingly accurate in predicting trial outcomes. Proposition 1, however, also offers some insight into the Fifty-Percent Bias Hypothesis. That hypothesis says that the plaintiff trial win rate will be closer to fifty percent than the percentage of cases that plaintiff would have won if all cases had been litigated and none had settled.
Note, however, that this hypothesis is generally plausible only if the following two conditions are met: first, the stakes are symmetric ( = 1) and both parties are equally well informed ( = 1); and second, the plaintiff win rate if all cases were litigated is not itself fifty percent. If the first condition is not satisfied, Proposition 1 tells us that the limit value of the plaintiff win rate will not itself be fifty percent (except by coincidence), and therefore, the FiftyPercent Bias Hypothesis is likely to be false for sufficiently small values of . 7 On the other hand, if the first condition is satisfied, the plaintiff trial win rate will converge to fifty percent, and thus it is reasonable to think that the plaintiff trial win rate in the real world (where most cases settle) will be closer to its limit value than the plaintiff trial win rate in a counterfactual 7 It is of course possible that and are not equal to 1, but offset each other in such a way that the limit value, world where no cases settle. The second condition is also necessary (and plausible) because if the plaintiff win rate if no cases were settled happens to be fifty percent, it is impossible for plaintiff trial win rates to be closer to fifty percent.
If these two conditions are satisfied, as a corollary to the Fifty-Percent Limit Hypothesis, we can conclude that for values that are sufficiently small, the Fifty-Percent Bias Hypothesis must be true.
On the other hand, if is sufficiently high, the Fifty-Percent Bias Hypothesis will not be generally true unless we make more restrictive assumptions about ( ′ ). We show that if ( ′ )
is symmetric (not necessarily around * ) and is logarithmically concave-conditions which are satisfied, for example, by normal and Laplace distributions-the Fifty-Percent Bias Hypothesis is true. These are sufficient conditions, rather than necessary conditions. This is clear since a small perturbation on the distribution of disputes would be unlikely to thwart the overall selection bias. Nevertheless, we also show that neither symmetry nor logarithmically concave cumulative distribution by itself is sufficient. See the Appendix for proofs. This Appendix contains proofs not included in the main text as well as some additional results referenced in the main text.
A.1. Priest-Klein Hypotheses under the Original Priest-Klein Model
The proof of Proposition 1 proceeds according to the sketch of the proof included in the text. We begin by showing several lemmas. Lemma A1 describes the region of integration for various values of . Lemmas A2 and A3 then pave the way for constructing a Lebesgue-integrable function ,1, ( ; 0) that dominates ,1, ( ; 0) in Lemma A4. The function need not be continuous. It need only integrate to a finite value. We construct ,1, ( ; 0) by integrating 1, ( − , − ) over an area that properly contains ( , ).  For all > − , ( , ) is bounded left by a vertical asymptote at = −1 ( − ).
is bounded above by a horizontal asymptote = −1 ( − − ).
is not bounded above, and if > 1 + − , it is characterized by a region to the right of an increasing curve that has two vertical asymptotes, at = −1 ( − ) and
.
has an increasing hazard rate, then the boundary of ( , ) in the first quadrant is characterized by an asymptote with a slope of 1, and the boundary approaches it monotonically.
On the other hand, if > − , for high enough and low enough , we can find some value such
and thus ( , )
is bounded left by > for all ( , ) ∈ ( , ). Therefore, ( , ) must lie strictly under the line = , and the boundary cannot have a slope greater than 1 in the limit. Now it suffices to show that, given any point ( , ) ∈ ( , ), we must also have ( + , + ) ∈ ( , ) for all ≥ 0. This means ( , ) must wholly contain its own translation in the direction of = . This will ensure that the boundary will have slope at least 1 at all points. To see this, we show that all points in ( , ) will be properly contained in ( . The last result is true (for > ) when ( ) has an increasing hazard rate.
Q.E.D.
Lemma A1 tells us that, for which is quadratic in in the denominator and therefore integrates to a finite value over ∈ [ , ∞). The integral over ∈ (−∞, 0] can likewise be shown to be finite. However, in this case we need not assume
is always bounded by a vertical asymptote.
Meanwhile, for all > 1 + − , ( , ) is defined by two vertical asymptotes. Therefore, where ,1, ( ; 0) = ∬ 1, ( − , − ) ( , ) where ( , ) is the complement of ( , ). . Then notice that the slope of the boundary of the region of integration, ( , ), in the limit is lim →∞
( )
. As long as this value in the limit is strictly below the slope of = / , which is 1/ , then a Lebesgue dominating function is similarly constructible. This case is similar to the case where < 1 + − . On the other hand, if it is strictly greater than the slope (1/ ), a similar argument as the case > 1 + − applies and so the limit will be 1. The path of integral will (eventually) lie wholly beneath the boundary or ( , ) in the first quadrant, and will be increasingly farther away. The only special case is when = lim →∞ ( ). In this case, we cannot rely on Lebesgue's Dominated Convergence Theorem along the integral path in the first quadrant. Note however that ∫ ,1, ( ; 0) ( + * ) 0 −∞ will continue to be finite. We show that ∫ ,1, ( ; 0) ( + * ) ∞ 0 = ∞. Note that if = lim →∞ ( ), then the limit of the slope of the boundary will approach the slope of the path of integration. In this case, for > 0, ,1, ( ; 0) must eventually converge to a constant positive value rather than decay. This is because the boundary of the region of integration is in the limit parallel to the path of integration, and as approaches infinity, the region of integration will become more like a half a plane that is only a certain distance away from . This is most directly seen in the special case when
has an increasing hazard rate, but the same logic applies for other case. When = 1 + − and = 1, note that from Lemma A1, we must have ,1, ( ; 0) ≥ ,1, (0; 0) > 0 for all . This is because ,1, (0; 0) is equivalent to taking the double integral centered at ( , ) over a region that corresponds to ( , ) translated by ( , ), which would be wholly contained in the original ( , ). where the region of integration is
Since , ( , )is symmetric with respect to and , , ( , ) = , (− , − ). Thus we can swap and without changing the value of the integral. Thus, 1, ( ′ ; * ) is symmetric around * , which implies 1,1 ( ; 0) is symmetric around zero. From Proposition 1, it follows that the limit value must be ½. Q.E.D. Suppose > 1. To show that the limit value of the plaintiff trial win rate is greater than ½, it suffices to show that ( , ) is skewed in the direction of the first quadrant in the following sense. Take ( , ) = ( , ) ∩ {( , )| < − }. Then ( , ) is the portion of ( , ) that lies below the line = − . Let ′ ( , ) = {(− , − )|( , ) ∈ ( , )}. ′ ( , ) is the reflection of ( , ) over the line = − . We show that ′ ( , ) ⊂ ( , ). This means that the entire region of integration that lies below = − can be reflected across the line = − and that reflection will be properly contained in ( , ). Since ( , ) contains additional regions above the line = − (because the horizontal asymptote is more positive than the vertical asymptote is negative in this case), this shows that ( , ) is skewed in the direction of the first quadrant, and this is sufficient to show that the plaintiff win rate will be higher than fifty percent. To see this, take away the portion that is symmetric, which is ( , ) ∪ ′ ( , ). What is left must lie entirely on the side of > − , and hence closer to the plaintiff's win side which is immediate. Therefore, the limit value of the plaintiff's win rate is greater than fifty percent. Notice by the same logic that the last inequality also holds when we have < 1 and > − . This shows that when < 1, ( , ) is skewed in the direction of the third quadrant, and hence the limit value of the plaintiff win rate is lower than ½. 
